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The Regulation of Insurance Claim
Practices
Jay M. Feinman*
Insurance claim practices determine the extent to which insurers will
or will not honor their promises. This Article describes the failure in the
market for claim practices, the failure of the regulatory responses to that
failure, and the ways in which litigation can provide a partial corrective.
The Article explains why the market fails to guarantee fair claim
practices, how market forces might be improved, and why, even with
improvements, market forces alone are not enough. It then describes claim
practices regulation by state insurance departments, argues that regulation
in most cases is insufficient, and suggests improvements in state regulation.
Finally, the Article concludes that private litigation, in addition to
redressing individual harm, serves a necessary regulatory function in
promoting fair claim practices, and it describes the substantive law and
processes that are needed to perform that function.
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INTRODUCTION
The paradigm of insurance distribution in the United States is the private
market,1 and insurance in general and insurance claim practices in particular are
prime examples of the use of regulation to facilitate and supplement the market.
In his foundational article on insurance regulation, Spencer Kimball stated, “The
major objective of insurance regulation is to facilitate the successful operation of
the insurance enterprise itself.”2 But a hoary aphorism of insurance law states that
insurance is imbued with a public interest, justifying the intervention of
legislatures, administrators, and courts to supplement and correct the operation of
the market and to serve nonmarket goals variously described as “important social
objectives”3 or “egalitarian or distributional concerns.”4
This Article describes the failure in the market for claim practices, the failure
of the regulatory responses to that failure, and the ways in which litigation can
provide a partial corrective. Market failure is endemic to the market for claim
practices because of information asymmetries, agency problems, and the risk of
opportunism by insurers. The response to these failures by state insurance
regulators could include improvements in the market, intervention in disputes
about claims, and focused or broad-ranging enforcement actions, but the response
has generally been inadequate to the task. Private litigation, both coverage
litigation and claim practices litigation—generally known as “bad faith”—also
serves a regulatory function. For the regulation of claim practices, litigation is
superior in concept and certainly in practice to administrative regulation. The
Article concludes by describing the desirable contours of the law and litigation of
claim practices to best fulfill its regulatory role.

1. Mammoth exceptions exist, of course—Social Security, Medicare, the National Flood
Insurance Program, state insurers of last resort, and more—but for most insurance the market is the
usual form of distribution.
2. Spencer L. Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of
Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 477 (1961).
3. ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 63
(5th ed. 2012).
4. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 580 (3d ed. 2013).
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MARKET FAILURES IN CLAIM PRACTICES

The regulation of claim practices, like most other forms of market conduct
regulation, primarily serves to facilitate the operation of the insurance market and
to remedy its imperfections. The function of the claim process is to fulfill the
insurer’s promises and the insured’s legitimate expectations of coverage.5
Therefore, the first step in determining the proper scope of the regulation of
claim practices is defining the imperfections of and limitations in the market that
may hinder the process in fulfilling its function.
Market failures with respect to claim practices are of three kinds. First,
insurance consumers do not possess adequate information to assess the relative
quality of insurers’ claim practices, so there is not an effective market mechanism
for influencing that quality. Second, the claim process is a strong example of an
agency relationship, in which the insurer has freedom to act in a way that will
affect the insured, but the insured has limited capacity to monitor the insurer’s
behavior. Third, and in some respects a combination of the first two, insurers
have the ability and incentive to act opportunistically at the point of claims.
A. Information Problems
Consumers need information for competitive markets to work well.6 In
choosing among insurance policies and insurers, a potential insured ideally would
have access to and would consider information about the insurer’s financial
condition, the price of the policy, its terms, and the insurer’s record of servicing
policyholders, including the quality of the claim process. Currently, and with some
variation among lines of insurance and among jurisdictions, the market provides
adequate information only on price. Personal-lines property/casualty insurance is
sold largely on the basis of price, and information about the cost of insurance is
easily available. Consumers can obtain quotes from different insurance companies,
increasingly through web tools as well as more traditional sources.7
Comparing policy terms is more difficult. Insurers usually provide
summaries of some policy terms to shoppers but refuse to provide the actual
policy language until after the policy has been purchased. Regulators in some
states publish summaries of key policy provisions or the standard policies of
leading companies online, but even then consumers require diligence and expertise
to discover and parse the relative merits of policy terms.

5. Issues of unfair discrimination or distributional concerns arise in the claim process only
incidentally. Tom Baker & Karen McElrath, Insurance Claims Discrimination, in INSURANCE
REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING ROLE OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 141 (Gregory D. Squires ed. 1997).
6. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 6 (7th
ed. 2011); JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 62.
7. Some regulators even have facilitated the process by providing price comparison tools
online. Auto Insurance Premium Comparisons, CONSUMER AFF. & BUS. REG., http://www.mass.gov/
ocabr/insurance/vehicle/auto-insurance/auto-insurance-premium-comparisons.html
[https://perma.cc/8YCE-7MWP] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
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Assessing the financial stability of insurance companies is both a collective
action problem and an information problem, and regulation has substituted for
market information to address these problems. Information about the financial
stability of insurance companies is a public good that benefits all insureds but is in
the interest of no single insured to generate, and measuring financial stability
requires a degree of expertise that few insureds possess. The solution principally
has been through regulatory barriers to entry as well as ongoing supervision and
required reporting of the financial condition of companies, supplemented by
private reporting services.
Claim practices is the area in which the market has completely failed to
provide adequate information to consumers (and, as is explained in Part II,
regulators have largely failed to supplement the market as well). When choosing
among insurers, insurance consumers have no means of evaluating and comparing
claim practices—which insurer is more likely to pay promptly, fully, or at all for
which type of claims?
The sole theme in providing potential policyholders with information about
claims practices is promoting a vague sense of security. For example, two of the
most famous slogans in American advertising history emphasize insurance
companies’ promise to provide security: Allstate’s “You’re in Good Hands with
Allstate” and the image of cradling hands,8 and State Farm’s reassuring jingle
“Like a good neighbor, State Farm is there.”9 Advertising indirectly evokes the
claim process, but it always has been institutional rather than factual, aimed at
providing a perception of security unsupported by actual information about a
company’s claim practices.
At this late date in the provision of information through advertising, it would
be difficult for a company to benefit from providing information on claim
practices. The data are not publicly available to document any claims, so the only
plausible effort would be to mirror the institutional advertising of other firms in
building or reinforcing a reputation for quality.
Indeed, advertising the quality of claim practices is potentially dangerous,
which may help explain the absence of such an emphasis. Insurance is sold as a
measure of security. Promoting the possibility that security will be denied in the
event of a claim, even by a company’s competitors, could diminish consumers’
belief in security and therefore diminish effective demand for all insurance.
A related factor is the unlikelihood of consumers successfully processing
8. See, e.g., You’re in Good Hands with Allstate (Allstate television broadcast advertisement 1950);
Bootsy’s Commercials, Allstate Insurance Commercial (1986), YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2007), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWw600H7bg0; Mark Miller, Old Allstate Ad: 1950s Allstate, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 16, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69aMq4HiaZc.
9. See, e.g., Like a Good Neighbor, State Farm is There (State Farm television broadcast
advertisement 1971); CommercialsUSA, State Farm “Like a Good Neighbor” Jingle Ad— “Can I Get a Hot
Tub?!?,” YOUTUBE (July 1, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OB6r2Wi0E98; State Farm
Insurance, The State Farm® Legacy— Like a Good Neighbor, YOUTUBE (Apr. 7, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9aS2JZkoQ4; State Farm Insurance, Like a Good Neighbor, State
Farm is There.®, YOUTUBE (Feb. 8, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaaHevyxvvA.
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information about claim practices. Consumers often tend to discount risk,
especially low probability, nonsalient risks, even if the potential loss is
substantial.10 Even though one buys insurance to reduce the consequences of a
potential risk, a consumer is likely to undervalue possible negative consequences,
such as the occurrence of a loss and the possibility that a company will fail to pay
in the event of a loss.
Nor are consumers likely to have sufficient experience of their own with
claim practices to assess the quality of a company’s performance. Most insureds
never suffer a loss, few insureds suffer more than one, and even fewer suffer a
substantial loss. Even including the experience of acquaintances, consumers do
not have an adequate base of experience to assess a company’s claim practices,
much less to compare it to a competitor’s practices.
Moreover, even if a loss occurs and the claim process does not fully
compensate the insured, the information inequality between a company and its
policyholder produces situations in which the policyholder may not be able to
evaluate adequately the company’s performance in the claim process. If a
policyholder does not receive all that he or she expects in terms of payment or
service during the claim process, the policyholder must identify the shortfall as the
fault of the company, rather than take it as simply an unfortunate event.11 Because
of the policyholder’s lack of expertise in understanding the insurance policy, its
interpretation, and the technical aspects of the damages and its consequences, he
or she is likely to accept the insurer’s explanation for the limits on coverage as
correct even if it is not.
Therefore, the market has produced little data that consumers can use on the
relative performance of different insurers in the claim process, and it is unlikely
ever to do so.12
B. Agency Problems
The second type of market failure in claim practices stems from the agency
relationship inherent in insurance. In an agency relationship, each party may have
different incentives and each may have access to different information, and these
differences may affect their performance. That creates monitoring problems
because one party who is subject to the other’s discretion either needs to incur

10. BREYER ET AL., supra note 6, at 6–7; Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the
Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1422 (2007).
11. See William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’ Y REV. 631 (1981).
12. Nor are there effective intermediaries who generate or analyze data to provide shorthand
forms of guidance for consumers. Partly, this is the result of the failure of the market to produce data;
if there are no data to be evaluated, intermediaries cannot serve that filtering function. Partly, it is a
collective action problem. Consumer Reports periodically surveys its members about their experience
with insurance, including claim practices, but such surveys are necessarily limited in scope. Some
websites seek to provide the information, but their data resources and reach are limited. See, e.g.,
VALCHOICE, https://www.valchoice.com [https://perma.cc/HTM6-QSKB] (last visited Feb. 17,
2016).
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costs in monitoring the performance or takes the risk of a disadvantageous
performance.
The agency problem is particularly acute in the insurance claim process. The
insurer’s duties with respect to a claim are vague, and the policyholder is poorly
situated to monitor its performance of those duties.
Ex ante, the details of the company’s obligation are not specified in the
policy. A typical HO-3 homeowners policy, for example, only requires the
company to pay claims within sixty days of agreement or adjudication and to
participate in appraisal; otherwise, it delineates no duties concerning processing of
a claim.13 The homeowner, by contrast, is subject to eight specified duties,
including prompt notice, cooperation in investigation, and submission of proof of
loss.14 Indeed, it would be hard to specify the insurer’s duties because they
necessarily rest on vague concepts such as promptness and reasonableness. As
expressed in the Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, for example, a
company must “adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation and settlement of claims arising under its policies.”15 Even when a
statute appears to narrowly specify a duty, the specification is usually qualified by
a vague term.16
Ex post, the insured has no effective means of monitoring the company’s
performance in handling the claim. The vagueness of the company’s defined
responsibly and the substantial advantage in information and expertise that the
insurer possesses creates an inherent difficulty in monitoring the performance.
More fundamentally, perhaps, the insurance contract presents distinctive
agency problems because it combines sequential performance with the lack of
substitute performances. The insured renders its entire performance first—paying
the premiums. In the event of a loss, the insured cannot withhold its performance
to provide an incentive for the company to fully perform its own obligation in the
claim process. In a typical contract, if one party fails to perform, the other party
can procure an adequate substitute performance, sue for any added cost, and, at
least in concept, be made whole by the provision of damages. Insurance is
different, however, as no insurer will sell insurance to compensate for a loss that
has already occurred.17 A legal remedy limited to the recovery of the benefits of
13. INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., HOMEOWNERS 3—SPECIAL FORM, at 15 (1999),
http://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/HO3_sample.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GDY-N57V].
14. Id. at 13.
15. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4.C (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins.
Comm’rs 1997).
16. In Tennessee, for example, an insurer is subject to a statutory penalty if it fails to pay a
claim within sixty days of a demand by the policyholder, but only if “the refusal to pay the loss was
not in good faith.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d. Reg. Sess.); see
also GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1892 (2012).
17. “[A] breach in the employment context does not place the employee in the same
economic dilemma that an insured faces when an insurer in bad faith refuses to pay a claim or to
accept a settlement offer within policy limits. When an insurer takes such actions, the insured cannot
turn to the marketplace to find another insurance company willing to pay for the loss already
incurred.” Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988).
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the policy is also insufficient because it fails to fulfill the promise of security. That
remedy does not give the insured the promised benefits until the litigation is
concluded, perhaps years later, during which time the insured is likely to have
suffered financial and emotional hardship and therefore to have lost the security
and peace of mind for which he contracted.18
C. Opportunism
The third type of market failure, which is an extreme version of the agency
problem, is the incentive and ability of an insurer to act opportunistically at the
point of claim. In the context of economic relationships, opportunism is the
practice of exploiting circumstances for selfish advantage without regard for prior
commitment, or, in the colorful language of transaction-cost economics, “selfinterest seeking with guile.”19 A party in a relationship invests costs and limits its
freedom of action in return for commitments from its contracting partner. In
some circumstances, the partner can take advantage of the sunk costs and limited
freedom of action by dishonoring its commitments, particularly where strong
controls on such behavior are lacking.
The ability to act opportunistically is inherent in the claim process. One form
of opportunism rests on deceptive marketing: an insurer may properly deny a
claim because it is not covered by the policy, but the insured’s expectations are still
disappointed because the insurer marketed the policy on the basis of a perception
of broader coverage or at least did not adequately disclose the policy’s
limitations.20 A second form entails a violation of the insurer’s obligation under
the policy, in which the insurer wrongfully delays payment of the claim or denies a
valid claim in whole or part. In both cases, the fact that the insurer’s claim
performance is subsequent to the payment of the premium, is only vaguely
defined in the policy, and is not subject to effective monitoring by the insured
presents a significant potential for opportunism.
Opportunism is advantage-seeking behavior, and the advantage to the
insurer is increased profit. Claim payments are an insurance company’s largest
expense, so reducing payments has the greatest potential impact on a company’s
bottom line. Delay in payments also is potentially beneficial because a company
invests premium dollars until they must be paid out.
The extent to which insurers act opportunistically is hotly contested. Insurers
and industry representatives acknowledge that occasional mistakes are made but

18. “Although the insured is not without remedies if he disagrees with the insurer, the very
invocation of those remedies detracts significantly from the protection or security which was the
object of the transaction.” Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 570 (Ariz. 1986).
19. Oliver E. Williamson, Opportunism and Its Critics, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 97,
97 (1993).
20. The potentially wrongful behavior here is at the front end of the insurance relationship, in
the marketing of the policy. The remedies for this sort of opportunism include regulation of policy
terms and greater mandated disclosure. Because the claim process plays only a supportive role in this
type of opportunism, it is not the focus of this Article.
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deny that there is systematic abuse. Industry critics argue in turn that companies
have increasingly viewed the claim process as a profit center.21 What this debate
certainly does is sharpen the questions about the regulation of claim practices. The
purpose of regulation is to provide incentives and controls to further proper
behavior in the claim process. Different incentives and controls are appropriate to
correct occasional deficiencies—whether due to simple error or individual rogue
adjusters—and systemic deficiencies that follow from institutional opportunism.
The market provides limited checks on opportunism in the claim process. In
lines in which the market as a whole is relatively stable, such as auto insurance,
retention is important, especially because the cost of acquiring a customer may be
so large that customers will not produce a profit for the company until their third
or fourth year of tenure.22 A bad claim experience may encourage an insured to
switch carriers if the insured is able adequately to evaluate the company’s
performance in the claim process and identify the shortfall as the fault of the
company, rather than take it as simply an unfortunate event.
With respect to consumers as a whole, however, claim practices are not a
major determinant of satisfaction or purchasing behavior. A company that delays
paying claims or denies valid claims in whole or part conceivably could suffer a
negative reputational effect, and reputation is an important element in consumer
purchases of insurance. But claims satisfaction is not the most significant factor in
overall satisfaction, particularly relative to price and among younger customers,
the largest-growing segment of the market.23
II. FAILURES IN ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION OF CLAIM PRACTICES
The presence of market failures means that market forces alone cannot
ensure that insurance companies deliver satisfactory claim practices. The system of
insurance regulation recognizes this fact and regulates claim practices in a number
of ways. First, some regulation aims to improve the operation of the market for
claim practices. Most of this type of regulation is directed at information problems
that disadvantage potential insureds; some of it corrects policy terms that are
particularly likely to cause problematic claim practices. Second, some regulation is
more direct, setting standards for claim practices and enforcing those standards
through administrative means.

21. See generally JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES
DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 56–120 (2010) (discussing changes to
insurance companies’ approaches to the claims process).
22. J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., STATE FARM AND GEICO CASE STUDIES: USING
SEGMENTATION TO UNCOVER PROFITABLE CUSTOMER RETENTION OPPORTUNITIES 4 (2009),
http://images.dealer.com/jdpa/pdf/09-US-PersonalInsRetention-MD.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBP8SHJN].
23. J.D. Power reports, for example, that of those auto policyholders who changed
companies, 15.4% went to GEICO, even though GEICO only has a 7% market share. Of course,
GEICO’s primary selling point is price. J.D. POWER & ASSOCS., 2012 U.S. AUTO INSURANCE STUDY:
MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION 2 (2012), http://img.en25.com/Web/JDPower/2012_AIS_MD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WRW9-6E4Y].
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The current system of administrative regulation of claim practices standards
is sound in concept. However, what is sound in concept is not realized in practice.
Administrative regulation currently does not achieve enough regulatory
intervention in the market to ensure that insurers engage in an optimal level of
observance of claim practices standards. Indeed, as constituted at present, it
cannot.
A. The Failure to Improve the Market for Claim Practices
Because the market is the baseline for the insurance mechanism, one
potential approach to improving claim practices is improving the operation of the
market, with particular attention to market defects that tend to produce
problematic claim practices. A principal defect that regulatory efforts could
address is the lack of information with which potential insureds can evaluate the
relative quality of insurers’ claim practices so they can more effectively shop for
insurance and, in the long term, create market pressure to improve claim practices.
But regulators have made only very modest efforts to improve the information on
claim practices available to consumers.24
The most widely available source of information is consumer complaint data
reported by state regulators.25 The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) collects the information from the states on its Consumer
Information Source website, allowing consumers to search for complaint data on
individual companies.26
When consumers complain, their most common complaints are about
improper claim practices. Nationally, of all complaints filed with insurance
departments, delays in processing claims account for twenty-one percent of the
complaints, claim denials for sixteen percent, and unsatisfactory settlements or
offers to settle for ten percent.27
The information about consumer complaints is incomplete and inexact; at its
best, it can only help in making rough identifications of outlier companies. The
strength of the data depends on consumer identification of wrongful behavior and
taking the necessary steps to report that behavior. Because many insurance
departments have limited or no authority to intervene in a policyholder’s dispute
with an insurer, the policyholder has little incentive to report.
Daniel Schwarcz accurately characterizes the presentation of consumer
24. See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance
Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 414–20 (2014).
25. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT
WEBSITES: A CONSUMER ASSESSMENT (2008), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/state_insurance_
websites.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20090323193247/http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/
state_insurance_websites.pdf].
26. Consumer Information Source, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, https://eapps.naic.org/cis/
[https://perma.cc/ZT4N-SSDM] (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
27. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, REASONS WHY CLOSED CONFIRMED CONSUMER
COMPLAINTS WERE REPORTED AS OF JUNE 30, 2014 (2015), https://eapps.naic.org/documents/
cis_aggregate_complaints_by_reason_codes.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GLH-9UAT].
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complaint data as “overlapping, confusing, and ambiguous.”28 The states and the
NAIC define categories that are impenetrable: There are “complaints” by
consumers that are different than mere “inquiries.” Some complaints are
“confirmed” by the department and others are “justified” or just “closed.”
Sometimes the company takes “corrective action” and sometimes there are “other
outcomes.” With these definitions, the published data are of limited usefulness to
consumers.
The NAIC provides a template for data that could provide useful
information. The Market Conduct Annual Statement (MCAS) provides a uniform
reporting system for companies with respect to claims performance.29 Companies
separately report annuity policies (for which there are no relevant claim practice
issues), life, homeowners, private passenger auto, and long-term care policies. In
homeowners insurance, for example, companies report information including:
 Number of claims opened during the period
 Number of claims closed during the period, with payment
 Number of claims closed during the period, without payment
 Median days to final payment
 Number of claims closed with payment within zero to thirty days,
thirty-one to sixty days, and so on
 Number of claims closed without payment within zero to thirty days,
thirty-one to sixty days, and so on
 Number of suits opened during the period
 Number of suits closed during the period30
After companies report the data, the NAIC aggregates it and produces
“[s]corecards . . . to show the jurisdiction-wide ratio and the distribution of ratios
for all companies filing an MCAS in a given jurisdiction.”31 The data and the
scorecards serve two functions. They provide a source for regulators to determine
where regulatory activity such as market conduct examinations might be most
advantageously deployed, and they enable companies to “gain a better
understanding of where they fit in the insurance marketplace and what
opportunities may exist to improve their performance in a jurisdiction by
comparing their jurisdiction-specific ratios to the scorecard for that jurisdiction.”32
As originally proposed by the NAIC’s market conduct committee, the data
from the MCAS also would provide more information to consumers on which to

28. Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study of the British and
American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 756 (2009); see also Schwarcz, supra
note 24, at 416–18.
29. NAIC Market Conduct Annual Statement, NAT’ L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS,
http://www.naic.org/mcas_2013.htm [https://perma.cc/PRU9-PEQH] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
The MCAS also collects underwriting information.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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select an insurer. The industry reaction was strongly negative.33 As a result, the law
in most states permits insurance departments to share the information with the
NAIC only on the condition that it be kept confidential, so the public will not
have access to it.34
The data collected by the MCAS could be made available to the public and
even could be expanded. More detail could be provided as to type of claim. For
suits filed, additional information could be included such as how much the
policyholder or accident victim claimed, how much the eventual settlement or jury
verdict was, and how much the company was assessed in interest, attorney’s fees,
and penalties. Even expanded in this way, the data in the MCAS would not
provide a perfect picture of claim practices. Because different insurers have
different market segments, for example, data are not wholly comparable from one
company to another. Information breeds information, however, and if claim
practices developed as a significant factor in the market for policies, companies
would be pressed to explain differences and even improve the reporting system
itself.
Most consumers surely would not refer to such data when shopping for
insurance, but the publication might have two salutary effects. First, it would
provide a quantitative basis for competition in claim practices that might
encourage the best performers to use the data in advertising. An insurer able to
promote itself as the company most likely to pay a claim promptly or having only
half as many policyholders forced to litigate claims might have a significant
marketplace advantage. Second, intermediaries such as Consumer Reports or
United Policyholders could compile and publicize indices of claim practices quality
that would provide the information to consumers in a highly accessible form.
The theoretical underpinning of markets is that competition breeds quality,
and currently the lack of a market for claim practices means that insurers are not
required to compete for quality in claim practices. In the absence of regulatory
intervention, no market is likely to develop, and regulatory intervention at an
effective level has not occurred and is not likely to do so.
B. The Failure of Administrative Enforcement of Claim Practices Standards
The administrative regulation of insurance takes many forms: licensing of
insurers and providers, control over policy forms and premium rates, and setting
financial requirements, among others. The regulation of claim practices involves
setting claim practices standards and then enforcing those standards.

33. See Jim Connolly, NAIC Insurer Conduct Data Scheme Riles Insurers, PROPERTY CASUALTY
360° (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2008/09/25/naic-insurer-conduct-datascheme-riles-insurers [https://perma.cc/Z6YW-62RY].
34. See Daniel Schwarcz, Differential Compensation and the “Race to the Bottom” in Consumer Insurance
Markets, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 723, 734–35, 745 (2009); Schwarcz, supra note 24, at 415–16. The
National Conference of Insurance Legislators’ Proposed Market Conduct Annual Statement Model
Act section 8 provides for the confidentiality of MCAS data.
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Currently there are numerous claim practices standards, some mandated by
statute or administrative rule and others from common law. The NAIC’s Model
Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, some version of which has been adopted
in nearly every state, contains many standards, some general,35 some specific,36
and some in between.37 Other statutes also set standards: for example, many states
have enacted statutes that require payment of claims within specified time
periods,38 and others have enacted statutes that more generally prohibit a company
to “unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim,”39 with unreasonableness
defined when “the insurer delayed or denied authorizing payment of a covered
benefit without a reasonable basis for that action.”40 Some statutory standards are
focused on potentially problematic elements of the claim process: California, for
example, requires that the policyholder be furnished on request a copy of all
claim-related documents41 and prohibits insurance companies from paying
adjusters any part of their compensation based on the amount for which they
settle claims.42
Setting standards for claim practices by itself may contribute to adherence to
those standards by insurers. Setting the standards clarifies expectations about
behavior, and insurers’ institutional cultures may adopt the standards as internal
norms. But that effect is limited. The basic principle of government regulation is
that more is required. Outside entities, either regulators or private litigants or both,
must have the incentive and mechanisms to enforce the standards, and the
sanctions and remedies available to them must be sufficient to induce compliance
by insurers.
The NAIC’s Market Regulation Handbook identifies a “continuum of
regulatory responses” for the analysis and regulation of market conduct.43 The
35. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4.C (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 1997) [hereinafter UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT] (an insurer must “adopt
and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation and settlement of claims arising
under its policies.”).
36. Id. § 4.M (“[Insurers must] provide forms necessary to present claims within fifteen (15)
calendar days of a request with reasonable explanations regarding their use.”).
37. Id. § 4.K (“Unreasonably delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring both
a formal proof of loss form and subsequent verification that would result in duplication of
information and verification appearing in the formal proof of loss form.”).
38. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-4-6 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1892 (2012); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2006 (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (West 2012).
39. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1115 (West 2012); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973
(“The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable
effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties
shall be liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.”).
40. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1115; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1973 (“The insurer has
an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle
claims with the insured or the claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable
for any damages sustained as a result of the breach.”).
41. CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 2003).
42. See, e.g., id. § 816; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:2-17.8 (2012).
43. 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MARKET REGULATION HANDBOOK 2011, at 11
(2012); see also Sharon Tennyson, State Regulation and Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry 9–10
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elements of the continuum are (1) contact with the regulated entity, (2) market
conduct examinations (MCEs), (3) enforcement actions, and (4) closure.44 Each of
these elements may take several forms. Contact with the regulated entity includes
interrogatories, interviews with the company, contact with other stakeholders,
targeted information gathering, policy and procedure reviews, reviews of self-audit
and self-review documents, and review of voluntary compliance programs.45
MCEs may take the form of “desk examinations” of a company’s documents or
on-site reviews.46 Enforcement actions range from an agreement for a voluntary
compliance plan through ongoing monitoring and self-audit to fines or even
revocation of the insurer’s license.47 Closure may include determining that no
further action is needed; communicating the insurance department’s position;
providing education, communication, or notices to insurers; ongoing,
nonstructured monitoring; and requesting legislative or regulatory rule changes.48
Along this continuum of claim-practice regulation, three elements are most
important: the handling of consumer complaints, market conduct examinations,
and enforcement actions.49

1.

Handling Consumer Complaints

Every state insurance regulator receives and processes in some ways
questions and complaints from policyholders about their insurers.50 This
mechanism has the potential to enforce claim practices standards, although the
effect is at best indirect and the potential is seldom realized.
When a policyholder files a complaint with an insurance department,
typically the department separates complaints from simple inquiries and, if the
former, determines if it has jurisdiction. Then the complaint is sent to the insurer
for its response. Upon receiving the response, a department employee may discuss
the response with the insurer and consumer in an attempt to reach a common
understanding or voluntary resolution of the complaint. In all but a few
jurisdictions, the department lacks the authority to authoritatively resolve the
complaint and may in any event refrain from doing so to avoid taking a formal

(Networks Fin. Inst. Policy Brief No. 2008-PB-03, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1106172.
44. 1 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, supra note 43, at 13.
45. Id. at 13–16.
46. Id. at 16–17.
47. Id. at 17–19.
48. Id. at 19–21.
49. In addition to these principal types of regulation, regulators sometimes mandate
alternative dispute resolution such as mediation for claim disputes; such processes may have an
incidental effect of encouraging adherence to claim practices standards.
50. See Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 750; William C. Whitford & Spencer L. Kimball, Why Process
Consumer Complaints? A Case Study of the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance of Wisconsin, 1974 WIS. L.
REV. 639, 646 (1974). The inquiry and complaint process involves other issues as well, such as those
concerning premiums and nonrenewal.
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regulatory action.51
The processing of consumer inquiries and complaints serves three functions
for insurance regulators.52 First, and the most obvious, is the resolution of
disputes between insurers and their policyholders, particularly small value disputes.
Second, disputes provide regulators with information about failures to adhere to
claim practices standards, either by individual companies or in types of situations,
and that information may spur other regulatory action. Third, the process has an
affective function—for the department itself by generating goodwill, as it appears
to be helpful, and for insurers by legitimizing claim denials or potentially
contentious claim practices.
Given the variety of practices across the jurisdictions, it may be hard to reach
general conclusions about regulators’ relative weighting of these objectives and
their success in achieving them. The existence of the complaint process may itself
contribute to the dispute resolution function and to an extent the affective
function. Referring consumer complaints to an insurer may spur company review
of the underlying matter, particularly review by a decision maker not involved in
the initial determination, that may result in a change of position in some number
of cases.53 This is particularly true for low-value cases or complaints brought by
less sophisticated consumers; in those cases any means of dispute resolution is
likely to be better than nothing.
Nevertheless, as a structural matter there is reason to doubt the efficacy of
the complaint mechanism in enforcing claim practices standards. The caseloads of
employees who process complaints often preclude extensive involvement. One
survey reports that in fifteen states complaint handlers have caseloads of 600 cases
or more, and in seven states of 1000 or more.54 The result of such overload is
predictable: nearly half of the states are unable to process all the consumer
complaints they receive.55 Regulators often refuse to address complaints in which
there is an unresolved legal or factual issue, which certainly constitute a large
portion of the complaints, both because such cases are resource intensive and
because departments often consider the resolution of such issues beyond their
authority. If the complaints are serious, they may warrant litigation and regulators
then defer investigation.56 As a matter of law and practice, the regulator’s role is
51. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 753.
52. Whitford & Kimball, supra note 50, at 670.
53. Id. at 675.
54. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 757.
55. Id. at 756–57. Because of industry influence, the NAIC historically also has limited funds
to devote to market conduct issues. See Scot J. Paltrow, The Converted: How Insurance Firms Beat Back an
Effort for Stricter Controls, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1998, at A1.
56. The focus of the dispute-resolution process is low-value complaints. For example, the
California insurance department asks on its complaint form if the complainant is represented by a
lawyer and states that if litigation is ongoing or pending, “If yes, we may defer the regulatory
investigation until the finality of the litigation. We ask that you still complete this form so we have a
record of your issue. Once the matter is concluded, we would welcome any information regarding
violations of insurance law by the insurer that you or your attorney are willing to provide.”
STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF INS., CSD-001-P, REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE (RFA) (2014),
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less about adjudication and more a form of alternative dispute resolution. Most
departments lack the statutory authority to compel a resolution of the case by the
insurer, so its employees act as an intermediary, making inquiries of the insurer,
perhaps offering independent views on the merits of the case and attempting to
achieve a voluntary resolution. The employees are not powerless in this process
because the threat of regulatory action, however attenuated, is always present.
Ultimately, however, the resolution of the complaint rests on the insurer agreeing
to it.57 Therefore, even though department employees may refer to claim practices
standards when they do seek resolution of complaints,58 their ability to enforce the
standards is limited. Nor are complaints likely to be a significant factor in
identifying broad regulatory problems: less than one-half of one percent of
complaints are referred to a department’s market conduct division for
consideration of a broader regulatory issue.59
2.

Market-Conduct Examinations

Market-conduct examinations can be directed at a number of areas, including
marketing and sales, underwriting and rating, and producer licensing as well as
claim practices. The guiding philosophy of market-conduct examinations was
stated in the NAIC’s first Market Conduct Surveillance Handbook:
Since it is inevitable that all companies will, on occasion, make errors that
result in unfair treatment of policyholders, market conduct surveillance
must be selective. It can only be effective if it focuses on general business
practices as opposed to instances of treatment of policyholders or
claimants, which may be infrequent or unintentional.
. . . [A] company engag[es] in a general business practice [when]:
1. The underlying cause of the problem, regardless of its frequency, can
be traced to a company policy or regularly followed procedure as
distinguished from an unintentional error.
2. The frequency of the problem—e.g., the percentage of auto policies
incorrectly rated—is significantly greater for the company than the
standard determined acceptable.60
While solvency regulation and rate regulation historically have been the areas
of greatest focus for insurance regulators, efforts have been made in recent
decades to improve market-conduct regulation, including but not limited to the
regulation of claim practices. In the early 1970s the NAIC engaged McKinsey &
Co. to investigate and make recommendations on systems for analyzing and

http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/101-help/upload/CSD001RFA20151224A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/28KD-SF7U].
57. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 755–59.
58. See Whitford & Kimball, supra note 50, at 678.
59. Schwarcz, supra note 28, at 753.
60. II. Rationale and History of Market Conduct Surveillance, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF INS.
LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/policy/ii-history.html [https://perma.cc/5Z29-EFSF] (last
visited Feb. 20, 2016) (underlining in original).
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improving financial surveillance of insurers and market conduct.61 Its
recommendations contributed to the development of a coordinated but voluntary
system for the collection of consumer-complaint data and the drafting of the
NAIC’s first Market Conduct Surveillance Handbook in 1974.
Despite the NAIC’s efforts at reform, progress was seen to be slow.62 In
2003, the federal General Accounting Office found that market analysis and onsite examinations were used inconsistently, resulting in gaps in regulation in some
instances and duplication in others.63 Since then, two trends in MCEs have been
reported. First, the NAIC continued its efforts at reform, particularly by
inaugurating new systems for the collection of market conduct data.64 Second,
regulators have relied less on MCEs in recent years. Between 2003 and 2005, for
example, the total number of all examinations dropped by eighteen percent; onsite, single-tate, targeted examinations fell by thirty percent, and lengthy
examinations fell by a third and high-cost examinations by two-thirds.65
Despite these efforts, the state-based system with national but nonbinding
coordination has produced substantial complaints by insurers that market conduct
examinations are expensive, duplicative, and wasteful. The Federal Insurance
Office’s report and recommendation on regulatory reform noted that:
Market conduct regulation has been the focus of significant criticism by
industry and third-party commentators. The principal reasons are that
state regulators often fail to adequately coordinate market conduct
examinations, resulting in multiple examinations for the same or similar
sets of issues, with all the attendant burdens and inefficiency.66
Robert Klein, one of the most widely published scholars of insurance regulation,

61. Robert W. Klein & James W. Schact, An Assessment of Insurance Market Conduct Surveillance,
20 J. INS. REG. 51, 61 (2001); II. Rationale and History of Market Conduct Surveillance, supra note 60.
Ironically, McKinsey would play a major role in redesigning insurance company claim practices to
augment company profits.
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-433, INSURANCE REGULATION: COMMON
STANDARDS AND IMPROVED COORDINATION NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN MARKET REGULATION
3–4 (2003).
63. See id. at 18.
64. For example, NAIC sponsors the Internet–State Interface Technology Enhancement,
known by its acronym I-Site. I-Site contains data on examinations, investigations, and complaints
supplied by state regulators and insurers’ quarterly and annual financial statements, permitting
regulators to assess market conduct issues across the jurisdictions. The effectiveness of I-Site is
limited by the data supplied to it by individual regulators, and under-reporting or inconsistent
reporting can be a problem. CAN. COUNCIL OF INS. REGULATORS, RISK-BASED MARKET
REGULATION: A SURVEY OF APPROACHES 6 (2004). The NAIC also supports the Market Conduct
Annual Statement, which collects and reports data on a variety of issues including claim practices,
with company-level data made available to regulators and insurers and industry-level data by state
made available to the public. The MCAS also produces reports on “outliers” among “nationally
significant companies” with regard to underwriting and claims handling, which may require special
attention.
65. News Release, Nat’l Assoc. of Ins. Comm’rs, Surveys Indicate Progress Toward Market
Regulation Reforms ( June 13, 2006) (on file with author).
66. FED. INS. OFFICE, HOW TO MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 53 (2013).
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concurs and comments that MCEs disserve the public as well as insurers:
“Currently, the states subject insurers to extensive, duplicative and costly
examinations that focus too much on minor errors and too little on major patterns
of abuse. In other words, regulators ‘miss the forest for the trees.’”67
Individual states’ experiences of MCEs are highly variable.68 Without a broad
study of market conduct examinations in all states and across states,
generalizations like those above are hard to document. That study has not been
done,69 and to the extent that the NAIC collects and collates data, it is not
available to the public. As a possibly representative example of what one might
describe as the ordinary use of MCEs, consider a snapshot of the New Jersey
experience. The New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance reports having
conducted fifty-four market conduct examinations over the past nine years, with a
high of nine concluded in one year and a low of three.70 A probably typical
example is an MCE of Esurance Insurance Company of New Jersey.71 The
examination was an on-site examination conducted under the standards prescribed
in the NAIC handbook. The examiners purported to “check[ ] for compliance
with all applicable statutes and regulations that govern timeliness requirements in
settling first and third party claims. The examiners conducted specific reviews
placing emphasis on” the state’s adoption of the Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act and other relevant statutes.72 They detected error ratios of twentythree percent in paid claims and nine percent in denied claims.73 The errors found
principally were failing to pay within the legal time limits without obtaining an
extension; also noted were failure to pay interest or sales tax due and failure to
give required notices. These errors fairly can be described as systemic—delaying
or underpaying claims in one out of four paid claims and one out of eleven
denied. Nevertheless, no enforcement action was taken. Instead, the department
ordered and the company agreed that the company “has taken or will take

67. Robert W. Klein, Principles for Insurance Regulation: An Evaluation of Current Practices and
Potential Reforms, 37 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 175, 195 (2012).
68. FED. INS. OFFICE, supra note 66, at 53.
69. Tom Baker, Qualitative and Quantitative Research on Tort Law Topics: A Comment on Helland &
Klick and Kritzer, 1 J. TORT L., no. 3, art. 4, 2007, at 4, 5. There are no significant law review articles
about market-conduct regulation, no significant insurance-treatise descriptions, and, apart from the
report commissioned by the NAIC, no systematic empirical research (at least that I have found).
Knowledgeable insurance-industry insiders regularly complain to me that market-conduct exams are
an expensive, paper driven, and mindless process that punishes insurance companies for minor
mistakes while completely ignoring real problems. I am in no position to evaluate these complaints,
but the alleged failure of market-conduct examiners to uncover the apparently massive UNUM/
Provident disability insurance fraud provides some support for it.
70. See generally Market Conduct Examination Reports, STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING & INS.,
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_consumers/insurance/marketconductexams.htm
[https://perma.cc/A8TU-XACM].
71. STATE OF N.J. DEP’T OF BANKING & INS., MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION OF
ESURANCE INS. CO. OF NEW JERSEY (2012), http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_consumers/
insurance/mcexams/esuranceadoptrpt1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AXF-Y39M].
72. Id. at 4.
73. Id. at 4–5.
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corrective measures” and the department would reexamine the company within
two years.74
Timeliness and the required notices are important. But the MCE’s modest
focus on “timeliness” (modest because the systemic errors were not regarded as
serious enough to penalize Esurance) ignores many other statutory
requirements—for example, those that prohibit:
c. Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation of claims arising under insurance policies;
d. Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation
based upon all available information;
f. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear; [and]
g. Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts
ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds.75
In Klein’s metaphor, the New Jersey experience suggests that too often MCEs
focus on the trees rather than the forest, and not particularly tall trees at that.
Less ordinary but significant is the use of MCEs following high-profile
events or spurred by other outside forces. The California Insurance Commissioner
performed a market conduct examination of State Farm’s response to the 1994
Northridge earthquake,76 and the Mississippi Insurance Department examined the
company’s response to Hurricane Katrina claims.77 Several high-profile MCEs
also have been precipitated by litigation. For example, a market-conduct
examination by the North Dakota Department of Insurance examined the
employee-incentive policies of Farmers Insurance and concluded that Farmers set
goals for adjusters that were “arbitrary and unfair to policyholders and
claimants.”78 A multistate market-conduct examination of Allstate’s use of
Colossus, an expert system for evaluating general damages in auto personal injury
claims, concluded in 2010 that the use of the system had not led to “systemic
underpayment of . . . claims” but that Allstate needed to “enhanc[e] its
management oversight of Colossus to ensure that it adheres to established criteria
and a uniform methodology in selecting claims to be used to ‘tune’ or modify the

74. Esurance Ins. Co. of N.J., Order No. E12-68 (N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins. May 31, 2012)
(consent order).
75. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-13.1 (West 2012).
76. CAL. DEP’T OF INS., MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT OF STATE FARM
FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY (NAIC # 25143) AND STATE FARM GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY (NAIC #25151) (1998), http://mail.consumerwatchdog.org/insurance/rp/rp000620.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2L3E-CNDS].
77. MISS. DEP’T OF INS., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL TARGET EXAMINATION (KATRINA
HOMEOWNER CLAIMS) OF STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES (SPECIFICALLY STATE FARM FIRE
& CASUALTY COMPANY) (2008), http://www.ins-compliance.com/images/inscomp/PDFs/2008/
1103_MS_State_Farm_MC_Exam_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE6L-N5H8].
78. N.D. INS. DEP’T, MARKET CONDUCT EXAMINATION REPORT: FARMERS INSURANCE
EXCHANGE 3 (2007).
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software to reflect recently settled claims.”79 Each of these followed high-profile
litigation about the subjects of the examination.
Market conduct examinations can be and in some cases are effective
administrative tools for regulating claim practices. But experience suggests that
their use has been intermittently and not always effectively focused on claim
practices because of resources and a limited focus, as well as because of the
broader issues discussed in Section II.C below.
3.

Enforcement Actions

In every jurisdiction, insurance regulators have the authority to directly
enforce claim practices standards through penalties for violations of the standards
and through cease and desist orders.80 The NAIC’s Model Act provides that when
a commissioner has “reasonable cause to believe that an insurer . . . is engaging in
any unfair claims practice” as defined by the statute, the commissioner “shall”
issue a notice and conduct a hearing.81 Upon a finding of a violation, the
commissioner issues a cease and desist order and “may, at the commissioner’s
discretion” impose monetary penalties or even, in the extreme, revoke the
insurer’s license.
Under the Model Act and many statutes, penalties are tiered. First, higher
penalties are imposed for violations committed “flagrantly and in conscious
disregard” of the statute.82 Under the Model Act, for example, the specified
penalty is not more than $1,000 per violation, or $25,000 per flagrant and
conscious violation.83 Second, penalties are subject to an aggregate limit of
$100,000 for ordinary violations or $250,000 for flagrant violations. Jurisdictions
have adopted different versions of these penalties. Connecticut, for example, has
modest penalties of $5,000 per violation and $50,000 in the aggregate per sixmonth period for ordinary violations and $25,000 per/$250,000 aggregate for
violations of which the offender knew or should have known.84 Others are more
dramatic; Illinois, for instance, has a penalty up to $250,000 for a single violation

79. News Release, N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t, Allstate Agrees to $10 Million Regulatory Settlement
over Bodily Injury Claim Handling Processes (Oct. 18, 2010), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/
press/p1010181.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZCS-VW6S].
80. See generally Steven Plitt & Christie L. Kriegsfield, The Punitive Damages Lottery Chase Is Over:
Is There a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort of Common Law Bad Faith and Does It Provide an Alternative
Deterrent?, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1221 (2005); Steven Plitt, Regulating Insurance Company Claim Handling
Practices: Rethinking the Unthinkable (Abandonment of the Common Law Tort of Bad Faith), 29 NO. 1 INS.
LITIG. REP. 5 (2007).
81. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 5 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 1997). Although the statute is directive and not discretionary (“shall,” not “may”), the
vagueness of the reasonable-cause standard and the lack of a means of enforcing the requirement
raise the possibility that regulators may not observe the requirements of the statute in practice and
may fail to initiate enforcement proceedings in all circumstances when there is reasonable cause to do
so. No studies of this issue have been reported.
82. Id. § 6(A).
83. Id.
84. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-817 (2015).
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with no aggregate cap.85
A few states provide guidance on determining the scale of penalties to be
imposed. For example:
In determining the penalty imposed under (d) and (e) of this section, the
director shall consider the amount of loss or harm caused by the violation
and the amount of benefit derived by the person by reason of the
violation and may consider other factors, including the seriousness of the
violation, the promptness and completeness of remedial action, whether
the violation was a single act or a trade practice, and deterrence of the
violator or others.86
Or:
The Division of Insurance . . . shall consider all pertinent facts and
circumstances to determine the severity and appropriateness of action to
be taken . . . including but not limited to, the following:
1. The magnitude of the harm to the claimant or insured;
2. Any actions by the insured, claimant, or insurer that mitigate or
exacerbate the impact of the violation;
3. Actions of the claimant or insured which impeded the insurer in
processing or settling the claim;
4. Actions of the insurer which increase the detriment to the claimant
or insured. The director need not show a general business practice in
taking administrative action for these violations.87
There is an important qualification to even the largest penalties. The Model
Act specifies a variety of unfair practices, but those practices constitute statutory
violations only if they are committed “flagrantly and in conscious disregard” of the
Act or “with such frequency to indicate a general business practice to engage in
that type of conduct.”88 The great majority of statutes include the requirement that
prohibited acts constitute a violation only if committed “with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice” or similar language.89 Therefore, single
violations, occasional violations, or even repeated violations that do not rise to the
level of “a general business practice” are not really violations at all.
Thus the enforcement mechanisms are limited in two significant ways. First,
an insurer may violate the statute but the violation may not subject it to an
enforcement proceeding unless the violation is a regular and repeated practice or
is flagrant and intentional; the regulators lack the authority to sanction serious
violations that are merely reckless or occasional. Under a more robust regulatory

85. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/154.8 (2015).
86. ALASKA STAT. § 21.36.910 (2014).
87. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-33-68 (2015).
88. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 3 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 1997).
89. Id. § 3(B). Section 3(A) offers a variation prohibits violating the statute “flagrantly and in
conscious disregard” of the law. Id. § 3(A). For a general discussion, see Plitt & Kriegsfield, supra note
80, at 1248–50.
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enforcement system, factors such as regularity and intent would go to the extent
of the penalty, not the presence of a violation. Second, the statutory penalties
available in many jurisdictions are exceedingly small. Individual penalties in the
thousands of dollars and aggregate limits in the hundreds of thousands of dollars
are unlikely to provide a substantial deterrent to insurers with premium income in
the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars.90
Even in those jurisdictions with significant penalties available, their use in
claim practices cases is arguably insufficient. As with market-conduct
examinations, a national survey of enforcement actions is needed to demonstrate
the full scope of administrative enforcement of claim practices standards. But
again, one state’s experience may be a useful example. During 2013 the Insurance
Division of the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance issued 123
consent orders, final orders, and orders to show cause.91 Of these, 118 were
directed at insurance agents, public adjusters, bail bondsmen, and the like; only
three were directed at insurers.92 Two of the actions against insurers were for
selling health-benefit plans that did not comply with the law, and only one
concerned claim practices; Aetna Health was fined $850,000 for improperly
delaying and denying claims and misinforming consumers.93
C. Why Administrative Regulation Has Failed
The failure of administrative regulation to substantially improve the market
for claim practices or to improve claim practices through direct enforcement
presents a paradox: insurance may be the most highly regulated industry in the
United States, but regulators have not performed very well in this area. In fact,
insurance regulators do very well in ensuring the solvency of companies,
reasonably well in controlling the rates companies charge, and not at all well in
regulating insurers’ market conduct, including their claim practices.94 Many factors

90. A third limitation is that penalties are never imposed on individual officers or agents of
the company, as they are imposed on individual licensees and, more to the point, on insurance
consumers and care providers in cases of insurance fraud. Many states have enacted statutes that
require companies to report to regulators whenever they have “reason to believe” that a “fraudulent
insurance act” has been committed. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 176.05 (McKinney 2015). The statutes
apply only to false statements made by applicants for insurance, policyholders, victims who present
claims to companies, doctors who treat those victims, and the lawyers who represent those victims.
However, the statutes do not apply to false statements made by employees of insurers to
policyholders or others. See Aviva Abramovsky, An Unholy Alliance: Perceptions of Influence in Insurance
Fraud Prosecutions and the Need for Real Safeguards, 98 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 363 (2008).
91. See generally 2013 Insurance Enforcement Activity, STATE N.J. DEP’T BANKING & INS.,
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_insurance/insfines13.htm [https://perma.cc/R2TMTVNE] (last visited Feb. 18, 2016).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. The hypothetical offered by Kyle Logue captures the insurance-claim practices setting very
well: “[t]hink of a regulatory agency that has a large budget for safety research, but that has a relatively
paltry enforcement budget (and little stomach for fining the heck out of non-compliers), such that
any regulated scofflaw’s prospect of being sanctioned by the agency is fairly small.” Kyle D. Logue,
Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2342 (2010).
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produce these results, but a plausible hypothesis is that insurance regulation is
most effective where the public interest and industry interests align and least
effective where those interests conflict.95 In solvency regulation, regulators protect
the public against financially insecure insurers while solving a collective action
problem for insurers. Insolvency often results from collecting premiums that are
too low or taking risks that are too great, and if one insurer does that, others must
race to the bottom in order to compete. Even insurers that are able to resist are
disadvantaged because the failure of one company diminishes the public’s faith in
all insurance companies and reduces the demand for all insurers’ products. Where
there is the strongest conflict between the public interest and industry interests,
regulation is weaker and less effective, and surely the conflict is strongest in the
regulation of claim practices.96
This hypothesis suggests that what is in play in market-conduct regulation is
a form of regulatory capture.97 Susan Randall comments that “the problem of
capture as it exists in other regulatory contexts is minimal when compared to the
problem in the insurance industry.”98 There is certainly sufficient evidence for that
proposition. The revolving door between regulators and industry swings
frequently.99 The industry is a major campaign donor at the state and federal level.
Influence also comes from organizations, and the insurance industry teems with
organizations that generate research and public-relations materials that shape the
thinking of regulators100 and “govern governance.”101 Industry influence is
magnified by the unusual structure of insurance regulation in which an industry
dominated by huge, national and multinational corporations is regulated in fifty
state capitals with coordination done by the public-private NAIC, which has its
own issues with industry influence.102 And insurance issues tend to be complex

95. For a survey of theories of regulation as applied to the insurance industry, see KENNETH
J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE 18–32, 137–66
(1988). Meier identifies as operational variables in regulation the resources of industry groups,
consumer groups, regulatory bureaucrats, and political elites. Id. at 138–41.
96. And in between the results are varied, almost random.
97. “Regulatory capture is the result or process by which regulation, in law or application, is
consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the
regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.” Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss,
Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE 1, 13 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds.,
2014) (emphasis in original).
98. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 639 (1999).
99. Four-fifths of the recent presidents of the NAIC have gone on to work for the industry.
A study of all state insurance commissioners serving over a seventeen-year period found that half
went into the insurance industry after leaving office. Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Philips, Regulator
Performance, Regulatory Environment, and Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on
State Insurance Markets, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116 (2008).
100. See James Kwak, Incentives and Ideology, 27 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 253 (2014) (ideological
capture).
101. RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 151 (2003).
102. See Randall, supra note 98, at 629.
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and of low public visibility, except when sparked by major events such as
Hurricane Katrina or Superstorm Sandy.103
Insurance-industry capture of regulation provides a good example of the
nuances of contemporary approaches to the understanding of capture.104
First, the early literature on regulatory capture focused on attempts by a
regulated industry to obtain favorable regulations from an administrative agency
that had primary responsibility for regulating the industry, such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the railroad industry. But capture more accurately
includes both statutory and regulatory capture—influencing legislation and also
rulemaking and enforcement under that legislation.105
The limits of the effective regulation of claim practices are both statutory
and administrative. In most states, for example, regulators are barred by statute
from making public data from the MCAS on an individual company basis, data
that could be used to improve the market for claim practices.106 And where
regulators have the statutory authority to publish claims data, they fail to do so.
Second, capture scholarship commonly has focused on industry efforts to
obtain favorable regulation. But capture may also be “corrosive,” in which the
industry “push[es] the regulatory process in a ‘weaker’ direction . . . with the aim
of reducing costly rules and enforcement actions that reduce firm profits.”107
Claim-practices regulation inherently favors insurance consumers over
insurers, but capture guarantees that the tilt is not too great. The modest
enforcement penalties available in most states and the even more modest efforts at
actual enforcement in claim practices cases demonstrate that nominally
proconsumer regulation can be corroded.
III. LITIGATION AS REGULATION
In a classic article on the choice between regulation and litigation as vehicles
for optimizing social behavior, Steven Shavell commented that:
[N]either tort liability nor regulation could uniformly dominate the other
as a solution to the problem of controlling risks, but also that they should
not be viewed as mutually exclusive solutions to it. A complete solution
to the problem of the control of risk evidently should involve the joint

103. MEIER, supra note 95, at 30–31 (emphasizing the influence on regulation of salience—an
issue “characterized by intense conflict of a broad scope”—and complexity).
104. See Carpenter & Moss, supra note 97, at 9 (“Perhaps the deepest problem with much of
the research on regulatory capture is . . . its lack of nuance in describing how and to what degree
capture works in particular settings.”). For a review of the literature, see PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE, supra note 97, at 23–172.
105. Daniel Carpenter, Detecting and Measuring Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE, supra note 97, at 57, 58–60.
106. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
107. Daniel Carpenter, Corrosive Capture? The Dueling Forces of Autonomy and Industry Influence in
FDA Pharmaceutical Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 97, at 152, 154;
Carpenter & Moss, supra note 97, at 16.
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use of liability and regulation . . . .108
The same holds true for the problem of controlling the risk that insurers will
violate claim practices standards. The market fails to adequately control that risk,
so regulation is needed. Administrative regulation would not be completely
effective in theory and is largely ineffective in practice. Therefore, private litigation
is needed to serve a regulatory function as well.109
The relative weight given to regulation and litigation in particular contexts
depends on a variety of factors. Solvency regulation has long been a primary focus
of regulators. Insurance commissioners erect strict barriers to insurers’ entry into
insurance markets and rigorously police capital requirements, reserves, and the like
on an ongoing basis. As a result, the insolvency of insurers that plagued earlier
generations is rare today. Moreover, litigation is unlikely to be an effective remedy
for insolvency as it does not provide ongoing supervision but only occurs after the
fact, when the occurrence of insolvency itself prevents an effective recovery in
litigation. Therefore, litigation by private parties has a minimal role to play in
ensuring solvency.
Where the actions of insurers are less rigorously policed initially, leading to
regulatory underenforcement, however, there is a greater need for litigation as a
supplement to administrative regulation. Claim practices is such an area.110 And
litigation about claim practices, unlike litigation about insolvency, can contribute
substantially to regulation.
A. The Advantages of Litigation as Regulation
There are three reasons that litigation can play an important role in the
regulation of claim practices: information, cost, and remedy.
The first reason relates to the superior knowledge and incentives available to
private plaintiffs as compared to regulators. Where an area is ongoing and highly
complex, requiring extensive data gathering and study, for example, regulators are
in a better position to acquire and assess the information needed to define and
administer regulation. On the other hand, where transactions are remote from
regulators, discrete, and of low visibility, private parties engaged in or affected by
the transactions are in a better position to recognize and process information

108. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation for Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 365
(1984); see also Logue, supra note 94. See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip
Viscusi ed., 2002).
109. Abraham calls litigation of this type “forward-looking” because it deals with both past
and continuing actions. Kenneth S. Abraham, The Insurance Effects of Regulation by Litigation, in
REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 108, at 212, 231. Political conservatives and
industry advocates often decry both administrative regulation and regulation through litigation. The
position of Friedrich Hayek, a principal intellectual forbearer of modern conservatism, was clearer,
opposing centralized administration but recognizing the need for regulation through liability rules. See
Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 375, 383 (2007).
110. “Ex post accountability is the prerequisite for ex ante liberalization. Without ex post
mechanisms, the American experiment in deregulation becomes a free-wheeling descent into
nonregulation.” Issacharoff, supra note 109, at 385.
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about the subject.111
For claim practices, policyholders are in a better position than regulators to
be informed about insurers’ departure from standards and to use that information
in litigation. That is true even though an insurer’s actions on an individual claim
typically are the product of a system in place for the resolution of many claims
because the system is only instantiated on a case-by-case basis. This is a
paradigmatic instance in which private parties have superior knowledge compared
to administrators because “the alleged wrongdoing is fairly concrete and aimed
directly at or knowingly suffered by private individuals.”112
Related are the different incentives presented to private parties and to
regulators. At their worst regulators may be subject to capture, and at their best
they may be burdened with many issues and have inadequate resources to meet
them. As long as litigation provides an effective and efficient remedy, private
plaintiffs have the incentive to pursue litigation with regulatory effects.113
The second reason is that the administrative costs of properly regulating
claims practices would be prohibitive.114 The promulgation of claim practices
standards through statute and regulations is a relatively low-cost activity, because
the standards are general and reflect widely accepted norms. The enforcement of
those standards, however, would require much more extensive resources. Marketconduct examinations are sometimes routine but, under NAIC standards, may be
triggered by factors such as an excess of consumer complaints. Conducting an
examination focused on the substance of claims, as through closed file reviews,
would be very expensive, as would the continued monitoring required to assure
that deficiencies identified in the examination are corrected.
Litigation about claims practices is not cheap. But it has two financial
advantages over administrative enforcement. First, the expense is only triggered
when there is a plausible basis for believing that the standards have been
violated—that is, a policyholder and her lawyer together have made a
determination that the policyholder may have a claim that justifies the expense of
litigation.115 Second, at least part of the expense is ameliorated because the inquiry
is initially focused on a particular case, even though it may broaden to evaluate
institutional practices.
A related point is the advantage of litigation in developing claim practices
standards. Many of the standards as stated in statute, rule, or decision are
necessarily general; litigation enables courts to apply claim practices standards in

111. Shavell, supra note 108, at 359–61.
112. J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1137, 1181 (2012).
113. What has been described as “the eagerness of entrepreneurially motivated private
actors,” Issacharoff, supra note 109 at 383, or “those parties who have sufficient incentives to
operationalize that information through enforcement,” Glover, supra note 112, at 1178.
114. Shavell, supra note 108, at 363–64.
115. See Steven Shavell, A Fundamental Enforcement Cost Advantage of the Negligence Rule Over
Regulation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2013).
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individual cases and to develop a more complete and more refined body of law.
The third reason is that in addition to serving a regulatory function, litigation
also serves important purposes that are not well served by direct administrative
regulation. Most obviously, litigation provides recompense to those who have
been injured by claim practices violations. It also serves the public value of private
participation in the regulatory process, as it “frees individuals from total
dependence on collective bureaucratic remedies and gives them a personal role
and stake in the administration of justice.”116
B. Coverage Litigation as Regulation
Litigation about ordinary insurance coverage disputes revolves around the
interpretation and application of the terms of the insurance policy.117 But there is a
sense in which this ordinary litigation is regulatory as well.
In a typical coverage case, the court begins with the relevant policy language.
If the court does not find an unambiguous application of the language to the facts
of the case, the court resorts to a variety of interpretive doctrines to resolve the
issue. Policy language is interpreted against the company as its drafter. Grants of
coverage are interpreted broadly and exclusions narrowly. The reasonable
expectations of the policyholder are given weight.
As a formal matter, interpretation doctrines look to the moment of contract
formation. A term is construed against the insurer-drafter because at the time the
contract was made, it had control of the language and could have resolved any
ambiguity, presumably in its own favor. If the insurer-drafter did not do so, the
fault is its own, and the insured should not suffer the consequences. Similarly, the
insured at the moment of formation had reasonable expectations about coverage
under the policy, created by representations of the insurer and its agents or more
general understandings about the allocation of risks under the policy. If the insurer
creates policy language that is inconsistent with the insured’s expectations, it has
the obligation to clarify the situation or bear the adverse consequences.
In commercial contracts generally, these doctrines apply by focusing on the
moment of formation.118 In the insurance context, however, especially in
consumer cases, the market failures inherent in insurance give them quite a
different cast, a cast that courts sometimes recognize explicitly but more often use
implicitly. All of these issues arise only at the point of claim, of course. The
problems of asymmetric information, agency, and opportunism yield a situation in
which the actions an insurer takes in drafting the contract provide the vehicles for
action at the point of claim. An insurer drafts policy language knowing that the
language is not subject to negotiation and that the insured is unlikely to read or
understand it. The insurer also knows that at the point of claim, it will have

116. Richard B. Stewart, Crisis in Tort Law?: The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184,
198 (1987).
117. And sometimes allied doctrines such as waiver and estoppel.
118. Or subsequent events, in the cases of waiver and estoppel.

2015]

REGULATION OF INSURANCE CLAIM PRACTICES

1345

considerable discretion in evaluating the claim, the insured is likely to be
necessitous of resolution, and it will be time-consuming and expensive for the
insured to dispute the insurer’s interpretation of the contract or evaluation of the
claim. In light of these factors, the interpretive doctrines are not only about
ascertaining meaning by looking back to the drafting process but also about
correcting the inherent imbalance in the claim process.
The difficulty of regulating insurer conduct in this way is summed up in Karl
Llewellyn’s aphorism that “[c]overt tools are never reliable tools.”119 Covert tools
invite attempts at redrafting and provide insufficient guidance for the future.
[S]ince they do not face the issue, they fail to accumulate either
experience or authority in the needed direction: that of marking out for
any given type of transaction what the minimum decencies are which a court
will insist upon as essential to an enforceable bargain of a given type, or
as being inherent in a bargain of that type.120
For Llewellyn the “given type of transaction” referred to the type of contract; the
problem with interpretation as a covert tool is even more pronounced when the
issue is another step removed from formation, namely defining the “minimum
decencies” of claim practices.
C. Claim Practices Litigation as Regulation
Regulation requires standards to which a regulated entity must adhere, a
mechanism for applying those standards, and a means of enforcing adherence to
the standards or of making violations of them sufficiently costly to deter such
violations. In order for claim practices litigation to best serve a regulatory
function, therefore, what is required is a liability rule that reflects proper claim
practices standards and that is capable of being operationalized effectively and
efficiently, a correlative damage rule that provides adequate incentives for
plaintiffs and achieves an appropriate level of deterrence for insurers, sufficient
visibility of the rule, and a remedy for potential plaintiffs.
The focus of this Article is first-party insurance, but litigation surrounding a
liability insurer’s duty to settle illustrates how these requirements can be met
effectively. A typical liability insurance policy by its terms creates a duty of the
insurer to defend claims against the insured and reserves to the insurer the right to
settle litigation. Even though the policy does not do so, courts uniformly hold that
the obligation of good faith limits the insurer’s discretion in settlement, creating a
duty to make reasonable settlement decisions.121 The courts adopt various tests to
define the limit—good faith and fair dealing, due care, reasonableness, equal
consideration to the insured’s interests—but “the differences among them are

119. K.N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing O.
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND
CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)).
120. Id.
121. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 832–49.
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subtle” 122 and they coalesce around a standard of whether an insurer that bore
sole financial responsibility for the judgment would have accepted the plaintiff’s
offer to settle.123 As applied, the standard provides a substantial guide for insurer’s
behavior. In litigation the standard requires evidence of the kind presented in the
underlying trial and expert evaluation of that evidence, so the litigation can be
expensive. But as a practical matter, most cases settle, reducing the costs of
litigation.124
Although the duty to settle arises out of contract, the bad-faith action often
is characterized as lying in tort, not contract. The principal advantage to this
characterization is the more expansive damages available, including damages not
subject to the limitations on consequential damages in contract law and in some
cases punitive damages. Jerry and Richmond summarize the advantages of this
characterization, all of which relate to its effectiveness as a remedy for the
violation of claim practices standards.
First, the extra damages recoverable in tort can help compensate the
insured’s attorney, and thus help give the insured a full remedy for the
insurer’s breach of the duty to settle, unimpaired by the transaction costs
of securing the remedy. Second, without the availability of tort remedies,
plaintiffs’ lawyers will be reluctant to represent insureds, and it is unlikely
that the insureds would find representations of a quality routinely
available to insurers. Third, unless the insurer is liable for extracontractual
damages, it has little incentive to perform its contract obligations. If the
most that contract will award is the cost of performing the contract
obligations, insurers will refuse to perform at all in some of the cases,
knowing that some insured will not take the time or trouble to pursue the
contract remedies.125
In short, the duty to settle is implemented through a litigation system that
provides adequate incentives for all parties and compensation to the insured.
Because of the breadth of the system, the development of a bar that makes
extensive use of the system makes it almost certain that policyholders will become
aware of the system and will be able to implement it. The duty to settle therefore
provides a model for the ways in which the regulatory purposes of litigation can
be achieved.
1.

Claim Practices Standards

In first-party insurance cases, there are numerous legal formulations of claim
practices standards, some mandated by statute and implementing regulations,
others from common law. The most common statutory standards reside in
enactments of the NAIC’s Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, some

122.
123.
2014).
124.
125.

Id. at 836.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 27(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2,
BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 4, at 511.
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 3, at 839–40.
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version of which has been adopted in nearly every state.126 Those standards do not
always constitute a liability rule enforceable through private litigation; some
statutes create a private right of action, most do not, and some courts use the
statutory standard, directly or indirectly, as defining the content of an insurer’s
enforceable obligation. The statutory standards often are supplemented by more
specific regulations.127
Judicial standards are most commonly set within the body of law known
generally but inexactly as “bad faith.”128 About a half-dozen states use some
variation of the Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co. standard of reasonableness, or
acting with proper cause.129 A much larger group of states has adopted some
version of the “fairly debatable” rule: “To show a claim for bad faith, a plaintiff
must show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy
and the defendant’s knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable
basis for denying the claim.”130
I have argued elsewhere that the fairly debatable rule does not accurately
reflect the common-law origins of the contractual obligation of good faith on
which it is based, nor does it honor the nature of the insurance relation.131 For
present purposes, three factors are especially important.
First, the nature of the insurance relation is one in which the insured
purchases security and not just contractual rights. The fairly debatable rule fails to
honor this relation. In effect, it includes in the policy a term that renders the
insurer immune from full damages in the event of a negligent coverage decision or
an improper claim practice unless the insurer acted with the intent to harm the
policyholder’s interests or in reckless disregard of them. This limitation is absurd;
no company would sell and no consumer would buy a policy that contained such a
provision.
Second, the problems of asymmetric information, agency, and opportunism
that plague the market for claim practices also are salient here. A strong standard
is necessary to substitute for the insured’s inability to define and monitor the
insurer’s behavior at the point of claim.
Third, the fairly debatable rule fails to provide adequate incentives to enforce
standards. From the insured’s perspective, it is much too difficult to establish a
violation of standards under the rule. In New Jersey, for example, the Supreme
Court adopted the fairly debatable rule in Pickett v. Lloyd’s in 1993.132 In the two
decades since, only about fifty-five cases involved an adjudicated claim under
126. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS 1997).
127. See, e.g., UNFAIR PROPERTY/CASUALTY CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES MODEL
REGULATION (NAT’L ASS’N INS. OF COMM’RS 1997).
128. See Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond Bad Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL
& INS. PRAC. L.J. 693 (2012).
129. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
130. Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 376 (Wis. 1978).
131. See generally Feinman, supra note 128.
132. Pickett v. Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993).
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Pickett; only five of those survived summary judgment, and only Pickett itself
involved a claim that was successful before a jury.133
Therefore, the appropriate liability rule is that an insurer must promptly,
fairly, and objectively process, investigate, evaluate, and resolve the claim. This
rule can be given further content by legislative and administrative standards and
judicial application. For example, the rule requires an insurer to reasonably
investigate a claim.134 The duty to investigate requires the insurer to seek evidence
that potentially supports a claim, not just evidence that favors a denial,135 including
even bases for coverage beyond those advanced by the insured.136 It includes the
responsibility to use the insurer’s own resources to investigate rather than simply
relying on its insured or others, to interview witnesses or others with relevant
information,137 to search for and consider evidence contrary to its own interests,138
to attempt to resolve apparent conflicts with the insured,139 to consider alternative
explanations,140 to use competent personnel to investigate,141 and to use experts
who are independent, objective, and unbiased.142
2.

Remedies

The lack of effective remedies for violations of claim practices standards
renders the standards ineffective; the insured would not be compensated for the
injury incurred and the company would not have a financial incentive to observe
the standards if damages are limited to the amount owed under the policy.
The damages rule should be the correlative of the liability rule. If the
policyholder litigates to enforce the company’s obligations under the policy, its
initial remedy is to receive the benefits to which it was expressly entitled: payment
of the claim. That remedy is insufficient to fully protect the policyholder’s interest.
The policyholder may suffer consequential economic loss from the failure to
receive, whether in a timely manner or at all, the benefits owed under the
133. H. Richard Chattmann & Aaron H. Gould, Revisiting Pickett v. Lloyds: A Survey,
Assessment, and Practice Pointers Regarding New Jersey First-Party Insurance Bad Faith Law, N.J. LAW., Aug.
2012, at 16.
134. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4(C) (NAT’L ASS’N INS.
COMM’RS 1997); see Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 171 P.3d 1082, 1088 (Cal. 2007).
135. See Bernstein v. Travelers Ins. Co., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Wilson,
171 P.3d at 1087; Egan v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141, 145 (Cal. 1979); STEVEN PLITT ET.
AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 207:25 (3d ed. 2011). This conforms to industry standards. See DORIS
HOOPES, THE CLAIMS ENVIRONMENT 10.7 (2d ed. 2000) (“Claims representatives should investigate
in an unbiased way, pursuing all relevant evidence, especially that which establishes the legitimacy of a
claim.”).
136. Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
137. Estate of Parker ex rel. Parker v. AIG Life Ins., 317 F. Supp. 2d. 1167, 1174 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
138. Jordan, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 320.
139. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 46–47 (Tex. 1998).
140. Hensley v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 210 S.W.3d 455, 468–69 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).
141. See PLITT ET. AL., supra note 135, § 207:25; see also WILLIAM T. BARKER & RONALD D.
KENT, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION § 4.06 (2d ed. 2014).
142. Guebara v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2001).
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policy.143 This loss may include a variety of types of harm, depending on the type
of insurance and the particular facts, and it includes the expense incurred in
pursuing the claim as a result of the company’s breach of its obligation to process
the claim reasonably. Because of the special nature of insurance policies, the
American rule on attorney’s fees and the rule of limited expectation damages
should not be applied to deny recovery for litigation expenses.144 Particularly in
personal lines situations, where peace of mind is part of what is being purchased
with the policy, the insured also may suffer compensable emotional harm.
Payment under the policy alone also is an insufficient disincentive to the
insurance company’s temptation to behave opportunistically. By delaying or
denying payment to the policyholder, the company increases its own profits at the
expense of its policyholder. If the company is liable only for the amount it owed
under the policy, the only check on opportunism is the reputational effect of
unreasonable claim practices, which works notoriously poorly in the insurance
market. Indeed, many policyholders who are denied what they are owed will not
pursue either their claims under the policy or the claim practices cause of action,
providing further incentive for the company to act unreasonably. Accordingly,
damages beyond the policy limits, including punitive damages in appropriate
cases,145 are necessary to reinforce the standard of reasonableness.
3.

The Conduct of Regulatory Claim Practices Litigation

For claim practices litigation to serve a regulatory function, the liability rule
and damage rule need to be operationalized effectively and efficiently. Currently,
claim practices litigation often has a significant problem in that respect: it is
protracted and expensive. Partly, this is due to the usual need in complex cases to
conduct extensive discovery and retain experts.146 Partly, according to
policyholder advocates, it may be due to insurers’ strategy of denying claims and
delaying litigation in order to pressure policyholders to settle and to reap
investment profits on delayed payments.147
Much of the time and expense of claim practices litigation is unavoidable in a
litigation system with extensive discovery and, at least potentially, jury trials. Even
143. E.g., Bi-Economy Mkt., Inc. v. Harleysville Ins. Co. of N.Y., 886 N.E.2d 127 (N.Y.
2008); Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 886 N.E.2d 135 (N.Y. 2008).
144. E.g., Brandt v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 796, 798–99 (Cal. 1985); White v. W. Title Ins.
Co., 710 P.2d 309, 320 (Cal. 1985). The California courts point out that the recovery of attorney’s fees
in such cases is not a violation of the American rule against the award of attorney’s fees. Instead, the
fees and litigation expenses are damages that flow from the insurance company’s breach of its goodfaith obligation. Brandt, 693 P.2d at 798. See generally DENNIS J. WALL, LITIGATION AND
PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH § 13:17 (3d ed. 2011).
145. E.g., Best Place, Inc. v. Penn Am. Ins. Co., 920 P.2d 334, 347–48 (Haw. 1996); Anderson
v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 379 (Wis. 1978); see WALL, supra note 144, § 13.15. Another
appropriate disincentive is interest on the amount owed at a rate higher than the statutory rate. E.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2436 (2013); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8371 (2012).
146. Charles Miller, The Scope of Expert Testimony in Insurance Bad Faith Cases: Can the Expert
Testify on the Meaning of the Policy?, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 211, 216–17 (2008).
147. See FEINMAN, supra note 21.
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though most cases settle, they do so only after many of these costs already have
been incurred. This Article’s initial discussion of the regulatory function of claim
practices litigation is not the place to fully explore alternatives, but two points
merit further exploration.
First, much of the time and expense of this litigation is about the scope of
discovery. Routinizing discovery would reduce this litigation, which is collateral to
the main issues in the cases, and therefore would reduce delay and expense. For
example, an insurer could be required to produce the complete claims file, all
relevant claims manuals, claims committee notes and procedures, and the like.
Second, many of the allegations of violations of claim practices standards
concern not the individual actions of rogue adjusters but systematic practices
throughout the company. Discovery of information about these practices is
relevant to a large number of cases, but its disclosure is often barred by blanket
confidentiality agreements or umbrella protective orders. Such agreements and
orders are appropriate to protect trade secrets, but, when overbroad, they simply
impose additional costs on future plaintiffs. For that reason, and because
disclosure serves the public interest, such orders should be discouraged.
D. The Effects of Regulatory Litigation
A regulatory approach to claim practices litigation obviously has an
immediate impact in individual cases brought by policyholders. A strong liability
rule with significant remedies increases the ability of policyholders to enforce
insurers’ obligations, producing more successful litigation and settlements. But
defining litigation as regulatory requires a greater impact than simply affecting the
resolution of individual disputes. Regulatory litigation, strong or weak, has a
systemic impact on insurers’ behavior.
Regulatory litigation affects the incentives of insurers, which in turn affects
their behavior in the large run of cases that do not result in litigation. As with any
class of potential defendants, insurers measure their potential liability costs against
the costs and benefits of compliance or violation, discounting the amount of
potential liability by the probability that suits for violations will be brought. The
regulatory function of litigation is better served as insurers’ potential liability
increases as the liability rule, remedies, and probability of suit become stronger. In
the absence of effective regulatory litigation, compliance with claim-practice
standards is determined by the market and by administrative regulation, which as
described above is inadequate to accomplish the task.
These effects are obvious. However, there is an additional important,
interactive process among the elements of insurers’ calculations. Strengthening the
liability rule and remedies causes an increase in the probability of litigation in the
short term because it increases the potential value of litigation to policyholders.
The long term, systemic effect of the strengthening is more important and
iterative in that it contributes to the development of a policyholder bar. The
presence of such a bar is a prerequisite to effective regulatory litigation, a
prerequisite that is filled once economic incentives are created from the stronger
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liability rule and remedies. This specialized bar is available to potential clients—
indeed, it recruits potential clients—and it can make the investment necessary to
pursue actions and develop the degree of expertise needed to combat the
comparable expertise on the insurers’ side. Much of this process is furthered by
the development of creation of networks and organizations of lawyers. An
obvious illustration is the development of a plaintiffs’ personal injury bar and its
professional organizations that were spurred by, and then contributed to, the
expansion of tort law through the mid-twentieth century. In the insurance arena,
anecdotally the policyholder insurance bar seems to be broader and stronger in
states with more effective law and remedies for bad faith than in other states.
Because discovery in claim practices cases can be extensive, including
discovery with respect to systematic violations of claim practices, litigation also
serves a regulatory function in producing information that exposes insurer
practices to scrutiny and potentially reframes the discussion about claim practices
and the need to address violations. This information-producing function is highly
important in spurring further litigation, administrative and legislative action, and
public awareness.148 The controversy about the use by many insurers of Colossus,
an expert system for estimating general damages, illustrates the intertwined loops
that begin with discovery in litigation, produce more litigation, transform ordinary
litigation into regulatory litigation, and spur administrative action. Colossus can
produce consistency across claims, but it also can be abused to underpay claims
through limiting the data input to the system, through “tuning” in converting the
Colossus severity point report into a dollar figure, and through treating its
estimate as binding rather than a guide for adjusters’ judgments.149 Instances of
misuse of Colossus became apparent only through discovery in litigation.150
Ultimately, the issue became of such visibility that it resulted in a Multistate
Market Conduct examination of Allstate’s use of the system; the Regulatory
Agreement that concluded the MCE noted two class actions as the source of
information.151 Although the regulators purported to find no systematic
underpayment of claims, they did find widespread inconsistencies in the tuning of
the program and required Allstate to alter its use of Colossus.
The impact of regulatory litigation is demonstrated by empirical research on
the effect of different standards for determining bad faith and different damages
available for violations of claim practices. Claims are resolved more quickly;
according to one study, claims are thirteen percent more likely to close in a given

148. See Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, The Tradeoffs Between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence
from Insurance Class Actions, 1 J. TORT L., no. 3, art. 2, Oct. 2007, at 1.
149. On Colossus, see FEINMAN, supra note 21, at 113–20; and R. Bonnett, The Use of Colossus
to Measure the General Damages of a Personal Injury Claim Demonstrates Good Faith Claim Handling, 53 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 107 (2006).
150. E.g., Declaration of Thomas J. Corridan, Dougherty v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. C07-01140
MHP, 2008 WL 2563225 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2008) (No. 307CV01140), 2008 WL 2556603.
151. Order Approving Settlement Agreement, Allstate Indemnity Co. No. INS-2010–00212,
2010 WL 4020127, at *3.
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period with considerable benefits to insurance consumers.152 Claims also are less
likely to be paid below the amount of economic losses claimed,153 and claim
payouts for both economic and noneconomic damages are likely to be higher with
the former showing a greater increase.154 Finally, and perhaps most strikingly, the
benefit of regulatory litigation accrues more to claimants unrepresented by
counsel than to those with lawyers by a factor of ten.155
CONCLUSION
The market for insurance works well in some respects. In all lines of
insurance, prospective policyholders have an abundance of information to
compare prices. Because the market does not always work so well, the insurance
industry is highly regulated, and much of the regulation is highly successful.
During the financial crisis that began in 2008, only a handful of insurers became
insolvent, a success attributable to effective solvency regulation.
But the success of the market and of the regulation of market failures has
not been uniform. There is no effective market for quality in claim practices, and
regulators have not provided adequate controls. The market could be improved
and administrative regulation could be strengthened. Even if that happens,
litigation has an essential role to play in regulating claim practices.

152. Danial Asmat & Sharon Tennyson, Do Multiple Damages Awards Succeed in Relieving Strain on
the Legal System? Evidence from Tort Law in the Auto Insurance Industry (Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus.,
Working Paper, 2011).
153. Danial P. Asmat & Sharon Tennyson, Does the Threat of Insurer Liability for “Bad Faith”
Affect Insurance Settlements?, 81 J. RISK & INS. 1 (2014); Mark J. Browne et al., The Effect of Bad-Faith
Laws on First-Party Insurance Claims Decisions, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2004).
154. Browne et al., supra note 154 at 383–84, 386.
155. Id. at 385.
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